Political Dissatisfactions and Citizen Involvement: Political Participation in Europe during the Early Stages of the Economic Crisis by Christensen, Herink Serup
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2016 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco   
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version) 
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 9(1) 2016: 19-45 
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p19 
 
Published in March 15, 2016 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
POLITICAL DISSATISFACTIONS AND CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 
Political participation in Europe during the early stages of the eco-
nomic crisis 
 
Henrik Serup Christensen  
Åbo Akademi University 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This article examines the links between three kinds of political dissatisfaction and four types of 
political participation during the early stages of the economic crisis in 2008-2009. Since economic crisis 
exacerbates negative political attitudes and thereby strains the legitimacy of the political system, it is im-
portant to examine how citizens convey their grievances to political decision makers during such crisis. Re-
cent decades have witnessed changes in patterns of political participation entailing that citizens abstain 
from traditional political participation in favor of non-institutionalized activities, but the implications for 
democracy are disputed since it is unclear what drives non-institutionalized participation. To ascertain 
what the changes mean for democracy during times of economic crisis, it is helpful to distinguish different 
kinds of political dissatisfaction with diverse implications for democracy. The data comes from the fourth 
round of the European Social Survey and include a total of 47489 respondents in 25 European democra-
cies. The results suggest that only some kinds of political dissatisfaction affect the propensity for political 
participation while others lead to passivity. Additionally, political dissatisfaction is not necessarily a major 
driving force behind the popularity of non-institutionalized participation since satisfied citizens are also 
involved in these. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Even before the recent economic downturn became a reality in Europe, the negative 
prognoses caused people to worry about their future economic safety. This also poten-
tially impaired the functioning of representative democracy since economic turmoil ex-
acerbates negative political attitudes (Stoker 2006). Already before the economic 
downturn most European countries had experienced growing levels of political dissatis-
faction and the economic crisis further decreased support for the political systems 
(Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). 
To ensure that no demands go unnoticed, which could further exacerbate the initial 
dissatisfaction; it is imperative that political decision makers remain attentive to all 
grievances during economic crisis. This makes it important to study patterns of political 
participation since these activities are the primary mechanism whereby political de-
mands are channeled into political decision making (Christensen 2013). Political deci-
sion makers can ease the concerns by remaining attentive and give all demands due 
concern, even though it is impossible to accommodate all demands (Esaiasson and 
Narud 2013).  
Economic hardship provides incentives for collective action (Gamson 1968; Barnes, 
Kaase et al. 1979), but what matters is not only that dissatisfied citizens mobilize, how 
they do so is also of importance. Recent decades have seen changing patterns of politi-
cal participation that entail decreasing levels of voter turnout and involvement in polit-
ical parties combined with a concurrent increase in participation in elite-challenging 
protest activities (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Norris 2002; Stolle et al. 2005). While some 
see the changes as positive for democracy (Inglehart 1997; Rosanvallon 2008), the 
changes have caused concern among scholars and practitioners. Traditional political 
activities are inherently connected to the proper functioning of representative democ-
racy, but their replacements frequently occur outside the formal political arena and are 
less obviously politically relevant activities (Micheletti and McFarland 2011; Esaiasson 
and Narud 2013; van Deth 2014). Political decision makers therefore do not pay equal 
attention to all forms of political participation (Hooghe and Marien 2014), which is part 
of the reason why the peripheral activities are unable to sustain the proper functioning 
of representative democracy (Stoker 2006; Mair 2006; Hay 2007; White and Ypi 2010). 
While negative political attitudes are recognized as a leading cause for the changes 
in political participation (Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999; Rosanvallon 2008), it remains un-
clear what kinds of political dissatisfaction are channeled into the political decision 
making through political participation. To understand what various political activities 
entail for democracy, it is helpful to consider political dissatisfaction a question of kind 
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rather than degree. Satisfied citizens who engage in political action do not question 
representative democracy as such, whereas similar activities driven by discontent with 
the functioning of the system pose a challenge to the viability of the system, especially 
during times of crisis.  
This study therefore examines the links between four attitudinal profiles and four 
kinds of political participation during the early phases of the global economic crisis that 
started 2007. The data are from the fourth round of the European Social Survey from 
2008 (ESS Round 4 2008) and include 25 countries and 47489 respondents. The results 
show that different kinds of political dissatisfaction have different consequences for 
political behavior. Furthermore, satisfied citizens are also highly active in activities that 
are frequently considered elite-challenging, which calls into question the implications 
of these activities for democratic stability during economic crisis. 
 
 
2. Political participation and dissatisfactions during times of crisis 
 
The financial crisis started in the USA in 2007 and rapidly became a global problem 
as economic performance declined all over the world. The economic turmoil quickly 
caused worries in Europe and thereby also affected democratic stability since the de-
clining economic performance caused negative political attitudes as the inability of 
governments to deal with the challenges led citizens to question democracy and cen-
tral political actors (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). Even though this dissatisfaction 
in the short term was directed at specific political actors and incumbent governments, 
it could in the long run undermine the legitimacy of the entire political system (Easton 
1965; Dalton 2004, 11-13).  
To confront these challenges, it is important for representative democracy that citi-
zens convey their grievances to their elected representatives so they can react to the 
demands and thereby maintain political legitimacy. Here various acts of political partic-
ipation play a central role since they establish channels of communication between cit-
izens and decision makers and improve the responsiveness of the representative sys-
tem (Christensen 2013). Citizens can be expected to be more politically active during 
times of economic or political crisis since the grievances caused by the turmoil provide 
strong incentives for collective action (Gamson 1968; Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979). Fur-
thermore, the link between political dissatisfaction and political participation could 
strengthen in times of economic crisis when there is a greater likelihood of achieving a 
critical mass of citizens who are ready to engage in political action to voice their con-
cerns. 
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However, what matters is not only that citizens become politically active; how they 
do so is also of importance. Traditional political activities maintain a direct link be-
tween citizens and elected decision makers and have thereby help keep the latter ac-
countable to the former. It has therefore caused concern that citizens increasingly es-
chew involvement in conventional or institutionalized political activities revolving 
around election campaigns and political parties (Stoker, 2006; Hay 2007). This has not 
meant a uniform decline in political participation since it is accompanied by a simulta-
neous increase in unconventional or non-institutionalized participatory activities 
(Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979; Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002; Micheletti and McFarland 
2011). These activities include clearly politically relevant activities such as demonstra-
tions (Norris et al. 2006; Hutter 2014), but also activities with a more ambivalent politi-
cal status that do not aim to influence formal political decision makers or include clear 
political demands (Teorell et al. 2007; Micheletti and McFarland 2011; van Deth 2014). 
Since the participants themselves define the modus operandi, these non-
institutionalized activities function according to a different logic than the institutional-
ized activities where the authorities define the principles of operation (Christensen 
2013, 104). While some claim that the developments benefit democracy (Hardin 1999; 
Norris 1999; Rosanvallon 2008), sceptics question whether the new activities can sus-
tain the functioning of representative democracy between elections (Mair 2006; White 
and Ypi 2010). 
The changes in patterns of political participation are connected to a simultaneous 
increase in political dissatisfaction. Over time, citizens have grown more assertive and 
less likely to quietly accept political decisions, which sustain the popularity of elite-
challenging political activities since citizens who are dissatisfied tend to choose elite-
challenging and unstructured activities over traditional institutionalized activities 
(Gamson 1968; Inglehart 1997; Kaase 1999; Rosanvallon 2008; Dalton and Welzel 
2014). Economic grievances are also often channeled through non-institutionalized ac-
tivities (della Porta and Mattoni 2014); although some argue that these issues are more 
likely to lead to institutionalized participation instead (Hutter 2014). Even if there is lit-
tle evidence that citizens are growing less politically active, the quality of participation 
nonetheless suffer since elected decision makers are less likely to pay attention to the 
new activities that often occur outside the formal political arena (Hooghe and Marien 
2014). By failing to give participants a proper say in the political decision making, their 
popularity could ultimately erode the legitimacy of the democratic systems. 
This discussion shows the necessity of recognizing different types of political partici-
pation to recognize what citizen involvement entails for democracy. While most studies 
agree that political participation is a multifaceted concept where different activities 
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form different modes of participation, there is little agreement on the proper dimen-
sionality of participation. Most empirical studies use factor analysis to examine the di-
mensionality of the data (Verba et al. 1971; Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Parry et al. 1992; 
Jankowski and Strate 1995; Teorell et al. 2007). Some results indicate that political par-
ticipation is two-dimensional, distinguishing between conventional and non-
conventional participation (Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979), voting and campaigning (Jan-
kowski and Strate 1995) or institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation 
(Marien and Christensen 2013). Other studies indicate that more modes are necessary 
to adequately capture the phenomenon (Parry et al. 1992; Teorell et al. 2007). These 
diverging results largely depend on what activities are included based on the definition 
of political participation and the data at hand. Since there are important differences in 
the theoretical conceptualization of what ought to count as political participation, the 
empirical indicators differ considerably. Hence, this empirically guided approach can-
not establish the proper dimensionality of participation as long as there is no agree-
ment on what activities ought to count as political participation. 
A more theoretically guided approach is offered by van Deth (2014). He also 
acknowledges the important differences between political activities in terms of their 
locus, targets and motivations (van Deth 2014, 353-360), but offers a comprehensive 
theoretical typology of political participation including four types of political participa-
tion. Type 1 includes activities placed firmly within the formal political sphere volun-
tarily performed by citizens and thereby corresponds to institutionalized participation. 
Typical examples include activities within political parties or contacting political deci-
sion makers. The three other types of participation identified by van Deth correspond 
to different kinds of non-institutionalized participation. Type 2 includes activities taking 
place outside the formal political sphere, but nonetheless clearly aimed at formal polit-
ical decision makers, as for example acts of protests such as demonstrations and civil 
disobedience. The third type of participation aims to solve collective or community 
problems even when the activities are not necessarily aimed at formal decision makers, 
such as involvement in organizations and networks that work to resolve local prob-
lems. The fourth and final type of political participation is the most controversial activi-
ty to regard as political participation since the status hinges on the motivations of the 
participants. An example is political consumerism, where people buy or refuse to buy 
products out of political concerns (Micheletti 2003; Stolle et al. 2005), but this category 
also includes various politically motivated online activities that do not fall under the 
other categories. This typology thereby highlights the central differences between po-
litical activities that should be acknowledged to understand what messages the activi-
ties convey during a crisis. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 19-45, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p19 
  
24 
 
In addition to this, it is necessarily to unravel the relationships between political par-
ticipation and dissatisfaction. There are different ideas about what political dissatisfac-
tion and closely related concepts entail (Torcal and Montero 2006; Torcal 2011). It is 
here understood broadly as negative attitudes towards the political system and actors, 
which means it is possible to identify at least two different dimensions of relevant po-
litical attitudes (Geissel 2008; Christensen 2014; Denk et al. 2015). The first dimension 
concerns political support, which has traditionally been considered an important pre-
requisite for democratic legitimacy (Easton 1965; Almond and Verba 1963). The second 
dimension labelled subjective political empowerment concerns the extent to which the 
individual feels willing and able to affect political matters, has to some extent been ne-
glected in most studies of the link between political dissatisfaction and behavior (Geis-
sel 2008, 39-40).  
Previous efforts examining the link between political attitudes and behavior have 
mainly focused on the impact of specific attitudes (Kaase 1999; Norris 2002; Dalton 
2004; Torcal and Montero 2006; Marien and Christensen 2013). These studies general-
ly assume a relatively straightforward relationship where negative attitudes diminish 
involvement in traditional or non-institutionalized participation in favor of new forms 
of elite-challenging or non-institutionalized participation. Although these studies pro-
vide important insights into the link between political dissatisfaction and activism, they 
generally fail to acknowledge that mixes of attitudes can have entirely different conse-
quences for whether and how people become politically active (Gamson 1968; Hooghe 
and Marien 2013).  
One way to examine how mixes of attitudes affect behavior is to study interactions 
between attitudinal dimensions (Hooghe and Marien 2013). An alternative approach is 
to identify different citizen profiles based on mixes of attitudes (Almond and Verba 
1963; Geissel 2008; Abdelzadeh and Ekman 2012; Amnå and Ekman 2014; Denk et al. 
2015). This provides additional insights into the connections between attitudes and 
behavior by conceptualizing the problem as a matter of kind rather than degree. For 
the current topic, it can shed light on what sorts of dissatisfaction promote participa-
tion in different political activities and thereby their implications for democracy (cf. 
Christensen 2014). This becomes clear when contrasting descriptions of critical and 
disenchanted citizens found in the literature. While both are expressions of political 
dissatisfaction, critical citizens are seen as beneficial for democracy (Inglehart 1997; 
Norris 1999; Rosanvallon 2008), whereas disenchanted citizens are alienated from and 
even hostile to politics and therefore constitute a democratic problem (Stoker 2006; 
Hay 2007). It is therefore important to establish what sort of dissatisfaction nourishes 
political activities to understand their implications for democracy. This becomes even 
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more important during political and economic turmoil when the possible consequences 
become even more acute.  
What different political activities entail for democracy is still disputed. It is common 
to assume that traditional or institutionalized participation is good for democracy while 
elite-challenging or non-institutionalized participation challenges the legitimacy of the 
system (Crozier et al. 1975). However, this approach does not adequately capture the 
implications for democratic legitimacy. For example, the electoral success of right-wing 
extremist parties in several European countries (Mudde 2007) is political dissatisfaction 
channeled into the political system through type 1 participation. Nevertheless, few 
would argue that this is a sign that all is well for democracy since these parties are gen-
erally considered a challenge for democracy. In a similar vein, demonstrations can be 
both system-supportive and system-challenging depending on the topics and the moti-
vations of the participants (Norris et al. 2006; Christensen 2014). This shows that insti-
tutionalized or non-institutionalized activities are not inherently good or bad for de-
mocracy. To understand what the activities entail, it is necessary to establish who per-
forms the activities and the attitudes motivating their involvement. Satisfied citizens 
who demonstrate do not challenge the modus operandi of the political system, where-
as the same activity performed by disenchanted constitute a challenge for democracy 
since it signals discontent with how the whole system functions which could ultimately 
erode system legitimacy. 
The aim of this study is to examine links between different kinds of political dissatis-
faction and types of political participation during the early stages of the economic cri-
sis. The empirical section examines the following broad hypotheses based on the exist-
ing literature on the link between political dissatisfaction and participation in times of 
economic crisis: 
 
H1: Kinds of political dissatisfaction have a negative link to type 1 participation and posi-
tive links to involvement in types 2-4 during economic crisis.  
H2: Low economic performance has positive links to political participation types 1-4 dur-
ing economic crisis.  
H3: Low economic performance strengthens the linkages between political dissatisfac-
tions and participation types 1-4 during economic crisis. 
 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
The data come from the fourth round of the European Social Survey from 2008 (ESS 
Round 4 2008). The field work for this round was carried out during 2008 and 2009 and 
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the data therefore give an impression of political attitudes during the early stages of 
the economic crisis and how these were translated into political action. At the same 
time there is sufficient country level variation in economic conditions to explore the 
impact of these on behavior since all participating countries were still not affected by 
the economic turmoil. This round of the ESS is also the last that includes a sufficient 
number of attitudinal indicators to capture the proposed framework of attitudinal pro-
files (more below), meaning it is not possible to examine the same linkages at a later 
stage of the economic crisis. Hence, while these cross-sectional data do not make it 
possible to settle the direction of causality unequivocally, it provides a unique possibil-
ity to examine the links between kinds of political dissatisfaction and political activities 
during times of crisis. Since the study is restricted to European democracies, Turkey, 
Israel, Russia and Ukraine are excluded from the study since they are (semi-
)authoritarian systems and/or located outside of Europe. This leaves 25 countries and 
47489 respondents, although some respondents are excluded from the analyses due to 
missing data. 
The dependent variable is political participation. The analyses examine four political 
activities between elections that are typical examples of each of the four types of polit-
ical participation identified by van Deth (2014): Party involvement (Political participa-
tion type 1); Demonstrations (Political participation type 2); Organizational involve-
ment (Political participation type 3) and Boycotting (Political participation type 4). That 
the focus is on activities between elections entails that the focus is more on how citi-
zens try to address particular decisions of formal decision makers (cf. Esaiasson and 
Narud 2013). All four variables are coded as dichotomous variables 0/1, where 1 indi-
cates having performed the activity in question within the last 12 months. 
To operationalize the central independent variable – kinds of political dissatisfaction 
– the respondents are classified according to their political attitudes. Previous studies 
have suggested different typologies (Geissel 2008, Abdelzadeh and Ekman 2012; Amnå 
and Ekman 2014; Denk et al. 2015), but only few of these have been used in a compar-
ative European perspective. The classification therefore follows Christensen (2014), 
and categorize respondents based on their levels of political support (political trust + 
satisfaction with democracy) and subjective political empowerment (political interest 
and internal political efficacy). The respondents are classified into four discrete catego-
ries with a cluster analysis; the results of which are shown in table 1. 
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Table 1 – Cluster analysis of political attitudes 
  
 
Dimension 1: Political support 
 Dimension 2: Subjective em-
powerment 
 
Total 
   
 
Political trust 
Satisfaction w. 
democracy 
 Internal Politi-
cal Efficacy 
Political Inter-
est 
 
  
 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  N % 
C
lu
ste
r 
1) Satisfied  0.59 (0.13) 0.73 (0.14)  0.63 (0.18) 0.71 (0.19)  11076 25.6 
2) Unsupportive  0.27 (0.16) 0.36 (0.21)  0.55 (0.20) 0.72 (0.14)  10722 24.8 
3) Disempowered  0.45 (0.16) 0.62 (0.16)  0.36 (0.18) 0.24 (0.16)  11381 26.3 
4) Disenchanted  0.15 (0.13) 0.26 (0.17)  0.42 (0.24) 0.21 (0.17)  10055 23.3 
  Total  0.37 (0.22) 0.5 (0.25)  0.49 (0.23) 0.47 (0.29)  43234 100 
 Eta2  0.56 0.55  0.22 0.69    
Note: Entries show the mean values of the four variables for the four clusters with standard deviations (SD) in parenthe-
ses. The clusters are the results of a two-step cluster analysis with log likelihood distance measure and Schwarz's Bayesi-
an criterion. All variables coded 0–1 (1 highest positive attitude). 
 
The first attitudinal profile includes satisfied citizens with relatively high scores on 
both dimensions, which means they support the political system but also feel willing 
and able to take an active role in political matters. The second profile includes unsup-
portive citizens, who have low levels of political support combined with high feelings of 
empowerment and thereby resembles critical (Norris 1999) or assertive citizens (Dal-
ton and Welzel 2014) by being dissatisfied with the functioning of the system but will-
ing to try to change this by taking an active role. The third cluster contains disempow-
ered citizens, who reverse this combination since they have high levels of support and 
low levels of empowerment. This combination resembles the description of citizens in 
Stealth Democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002); although the high level of support 
presupposes that these respondents think that the current system functions. The 
fourth and final profile includes disenchanted citizens with low levels of political sup-
port and subjective political empowerment, who constitute the most severe democrat-
ic problem (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007). 
The eta2-scores show that this classification captures a substantial part of the varia-
tion in the four constitutive variables and that the typology therefore provides an ade-
quate classification of the respondents based on these attitudes. The four profiles are 
in the analysis operationalized as a categorical variable where each profile constitutes a 
category and the group of satisfied constitutes the reference category in the regression 
analyses. 
The economic situation is operationalized using two central economic indicators at 
the country level. The annual growth of GDP is important since economic wellbeing in 
modern capitalist societies requires high economic growth, and this is measured with 
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the annual growth rate of GDP. The rate of unemployment is an important comple-
ment since it provides a more direct threat to the wellbeing of individuals when unem-
ployment, or the risk thereof, increases in society. This is measured with the annual 
level of unemployment in percentage of the labor force.  
The impact of the economy is also measured at the individual level since macro fac-
tors can affect individuals differently and some feel that their economic situation is un-
tenable even when the economic conditions at country level are respectable. To probe 
this aspect of the economic situation, the models include a variable measuring satisfac-
tion with household income. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max VIF 
Political participation 
     
 
Party involvement 47340 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 N/A 
Demonstrations 47334 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 N/A 
Organizational involvement 47316 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 N/A 
Boycotting 47242 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 N/A 
Citizen profiles 
     
 
Satisfied 11076 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 REF 
Disempowered 11381 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.73 
Unsupportive 10722 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.69 
Disenchanted 10055 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 2.01 
Total 43234 
    
 
Economic indicators 
     
 
GDP growth 47489 4.64 2.35 0.11 10.49 1.38 
Unemployment 47489 7.28 2.80 2.50 12.70 1.38 
Feelings household income 47032 0.63 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.49 
Control variables 
     
 
Corruption 47489 6.65 1.86 3.70 9.40 2.18 
Age 47342 0.48 0.18 0.15 1.23 1.25 
Gender 47459 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.03 
Education 47373 0.52 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.23 
Party identification 46537 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.18 
Voted 47041 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.22 
Social trust 46910 0.50 0.20 0.00 1.00 1.38 
Social life 47225 0.65 0.27 0.00 1.00 1.13 
Life satisfaction 47237 0.67 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.41 
Note: Entries show descriptive statistics for the variables at the individual level. Unweighted data. 
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The main part of the analyses consists of a series of multilevel logistic regression 
models that examine the link between the forms of dissatisfaction and involvement in 
the four types of political participation to establish what forms of dissatisfaction are 
tied to what activities.  As is customary, continuous variables have been centered 
around the grand mean to increase the stability of the models.1 The models presented 
include several control variables to ascertain that the relationships are not spurious. 
This includes the socio-demographic characteristics age, gender and education, which 
are known to affect political behavior (Verba et al. 1995). The models also control for 
prior political involvement of the respondents by including party identification and 
whether the respondents voted in the latest general elections. Finally, to control for 
the respondents’ general attitudes towards their life situations, the models also include 
generalized social trust, how social they are and general life satisfaction. At the country 
level, the models control for the level of corruption as an indicator of the general quali-
ty of governance. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables while information on the coding 
of variables is in appendix 1. The VIF scores show no reason to suspect problems with 
multicollinearity since all scores are below 2.5. 
 
 
4. Analysis 
 
As a first step in the analyses, table 3 displays distributions of citizen profiles, politi-
cal participation and economic conditions for all countries in the study to give an idea 
of country level differences in these regards. 
There is considerable variation in the distribution of the citizen profiles across coun-
tries. Satisfied citizens generally form the majority or the major share in Northern Eu-
rope, but the three forms of political dissatisfaction combined form an overall majority. 
Nevertheless, there are important differences in what kind of dissatisfaction domi-
nates. The disenchanted citizens are plentiful in Southern and Eastern Europe, while 
unsupportive citizens form the largest group in countries such as France, Great Britain 
and Poland. While disempowered citizens constitute large shares of the populations in 
most countries, they only form the largest group in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bel-
gium and most noticeably Spain, where they form 48 per cent of the population. Hence 
while political dissatisfaction is widespread, there is no particular kind of dissatisfaction 
 
1
 The multilevel analyses are performed with the help of the runmlwin module in Stata 13 and MLwiN 2.34 
(Leckie and Charlton 2013).  
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that dominates in Europe, as also noted by Denk et al. (2015). This indicates important 
differences among the countries in what political dissatisfaction entails for democracy. 
 
Table 3 – Country level distributions of attitudinal profiles and political participation 
  Kinds of Citizens  
(% belong) 
 Political participation 
type (% performed) 
 Economic condi-
tions 
Country (n) 
 Satisfie
d
 
D
ise
m
p
o
w
ere
d
 
U
n
su
p
p
o
rtive 
D
ise
n
ch
an
te
d
 
 1
: P
arty in
vo
lve
-
m
e
n
t 
2
: D
em
o
n
stratio
n
s 
3
: O
rgan
izatio
n
al in
-
vo
lvem
en
t  
4
: B
o
yco
ttin
g 
 A
n
n
u
al G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 
(%
) 
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
e
n
t (%
) 
Satisfactio
n
 in
co
m
e
 
(m
ean
 0
-1
) 
BE (1760)  26.2 33.7 23.8 16.4  4.3 7.4 21.1 11.1  2.9 8.4 0.7 
BG (2230)  4.5 5.3 47.1 43.2  3.6 4.0 1.8 3.5  6.4 7.3 0.3 
CH (1819)  54.3 29.5 11.9 4.4  5.0 7.8 13.1 25.0  3.9 4.5 0.8 
CY (1215)  44.1 35.1 12.3 8.5  8.7 2.3 6.5 6.1  5.1 4.4 0.6 
CZ (2018)  9.0 40.9 12.6 37.5  2.3 4.5 9.0 7.4  5.7 6.7 0.6 
DE (2751)  33.5 21.3 31.2 13.9  3.8 8.1 25.9 31.1  3.3 8.8 0.7 
DK (1610)  69.2 20.0 8.8 1.9  4.5 9.3 24.7 21.5  1.6 4.2 0.9 
EE (1661)  19.6 24.8 29.3 26.3  3.0 2.1 5.3 5.6  7.5 3.9 0.6 
ES (2576)  19.2 48.1 13.8 18.9  2.9 15.9 9.5 7.9  3.5 11.0 0.7 
FI (2195)  42.6 38.5 11.6 7.3  4.1 2.5 34.1 30.3  5.3 7.2 0.7 
FR (2073)  21.2 25.7 32.4 20.7  3.8 15.3 15.2 27.7  2.3 8.6 0.7 
GB (2352)  26.6 21.8 33.5 18.1  2.2 3.8 6.6 24.2  3.6 5.0 0.7 
GR (2072)  11.5 28.0 21.4 39.1  4.2 6.1 4.0 14.4  3.5 12.7 0.5 
HR (1484)  9.0 20.5 25.7 44.8  5.1 7.9 9.1 17.1  5.1 11.1 0.6 
HU (1544)  5.9 12.9 35.0 46.2  0.8 1.8 5.1 5.9  0.1 7.6 0.5 
IE (1764)  20.6 18.7 37.1 23.6  4.7 9.8 16.5 13.5  5.2 4.2 0.7 
LV (1980)  3.2 14.1 35.0 47.7  1.1 6.5 2.8 5.2  10.0 5.6 0.4 
NL (1778)  53.0 25.9 16.8 4.2  3.4 3.3 26.2 9.4  3.9 3.6 0.8 
NO (1549)  43.9 38.1 11.2 6.9  6.1 7.2 27.9 22.5  2.7 2.5 0.8 
PL (1619)  13.4 22.5 33.9 30.3  2.6 1.5 5.9 4.5  6.8 10.3 0.6 
PT (2367)  9.3 27.5 23.1 40.1  1.3 3.7 2.7 3.2  2.4 9.6 0.5 
RO (2146)  17.3 20.1 30.2 32.4  5.9 4.2 3.0 2.8  6.0 5.4 0.5 
SE (1830)  49.2 29.1 14.9 6.8  4.4 6.4 27.0 37.3  3.3 6.6 0.8 
SI (1286)  21.5 26.8 32.5 19.2  3.3 1.6 1.6 5.1  6.9 5.9 0.7 
SK (1810)  21.2 30.6 25.9 22.3  1.9 1.7 5.7 6.9  10.5 12.5 0.6 
TOTAL (47489)  25.8 26.6 24.5 23.1  3.6 6.1 12.6 14.4  4.6 7.3 0.6 
Note: Entries are percentages belonging to the categories in question. Data weighted with design weight. Satisfaction 
income coded 0-1 with 1 indicating higher satisfaction. 
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When it comes to the political activities, the changes in patterns of political partici-
pation are clearly evident since involvement in political parties (Type 1) is generally the 
least popular activity, while more people participate in non-institutionalized activities 
(Types 2-4) with boycotting being most popular in most countries closely followed by 
organization activities.  
There are noticeable differences in the economic conditions among the countries in-
cluded. While some countries have already low growth and high unemployment, oth-
ers are still thriving economically. These differences are also reflected in the scores for 
satisfaction with income, where there are considerable differences in the mean scores 
among the countries. While some countries, most notably Denmark, have high levels of 
satisfaction with household income, there are clearly other countries such as Bulgaria 
where the low mean score indicates that large proportions of the populations feel they 
are struggling economically. 
To further explore the link between attitudes and behavior at the individual level 
during economic crisis, table 4 displays differences in the activity levels among the four 
citizen categories.  
 
Table 4 – Percentages having performed each activity within citizen profiles 
 
 Activity (% has done) 
Citizen group 
 
Party involvement  Demonstrations 
Organizational in-
volvement  Boycotting 
Satisfied  7.5 7.9 24.2 23.0 
Disempowered  1.2 4.4 9.5 9.7 
Unsupportive  5.3 9.1 14.3 19.5 
Disenchanted  1.3 4.0 5.0 8.9 
Total  3.8 6.3 13.4 15.3 
χ2 (value, DF, p)  (858.8, 3, 0.000) (353.8, 3, 0.000) (1887.3, 3, 0.000) (1238.3, 3, 0.000) 
Eta  0.14 0.09 0.21 0.17 
Cramer's V  0.14 0.09 0.21 0.17 
ANOVA (F, p)  (292.0, 0.000) (119.2, 0.000) (657.7, 0.000) (424.7, 0.000) 
N valid cases  43207 43199 43192 43119 
Note: Entries show percentages within each citizen category having performed political activities. Data weighted with 
design weight.  
 
The statistical tests all indicate significant differences between the groups in how 
many have performed the different activities. However, somewhat contrary to expec-
tations, the satisfied citizens are most active in three of the four activities, the excep-
tion being demonstrations, where the unsupportive citizens are more active. The least 
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active group of citizens is the disenchanted, who are least active in three of four activi-
ties while the disempowered are marginally less likely to be active in political parties. It 
should be noted that dissatisfaction in either form does not seem to be a necessary 
driving force behind either kind of non-institutionalized participation. Furthermore, 
there are important differences in the behavior of the three forms of dissatisfaction, 
which shows that different kinds of political dissatisfaction do not necessarily lead to 
similar behavior during economic crisis. 
 
Table 5 – Multilevel logistic regressions examining explanations for political participation 
 
PARTY INVOLVE-
MENT DEMONSTRATIONS 
ORGANIZATIONAL  
INVOLVEMENT BOYCOTTING 
 B      (SE)   P B (SE)   P B (SE)   P B (SE)   P 
Fixed effects 
            Individual level             
Constant -4.37 (0.13) *** -3.47 (0.14) *** -2.81 (0.13) *** -2.36 (0.12) *** 
Citizen group (ref Satisfied) 
         
  . 
Disempowered -1.38 (0.10) *** -0.55 (0.07) *** -0.57 (0.05) *** -0.60 (0.04) *** 
Unsupportive -0.19 (0.07) ** 0.36 (0.06) *** 0.07 (0.04) 
 
0.34 (0.04) *** 
Disenchanted -1.22 (0.11) *** -0.43 (0.08) *** -0.62 (0.06) *** -0.23 (0.05) *** 
Satisfaction income 0.23 (0.12) * -0.29 (0.09) ** 0.30 (0.07) *** 0.13 (0.07)  
Age 0.05 (0.17)  -1.86 (0.14) *** 0.03 (0.10)  -0.79 (0.10) *** 
Gender (ref. Female) 0.24 (0.05) *** -0.03 (0.04) 
 
0.27 (0.03) *** -0.23 (0.03) *** 
Education 0.59 (0.09) *** 0.70 (0.07) *** 0.88 (0.05) *** 1.06 (0.05) *** 
Party identification (ref No) 1.33 (0.08) *** 0.59 (0.05) *** 0.43 (0.03) *** 0.46 (0.03) *** 
Voted (ref No) 0.55 (0.09) *** 0.17 (0.06) ** 0.40 (0.05) *** 0.22 (0.04) *** 
Social trust -0.28 (0.16) 
 
0.83 (0.13) *** 0.52 (0.10) *** 0.08 (0.09) 
 Social life 0.84 (0.12) *** 0.81 (0.10) *** 1.04 (0.07) *** 0.24 (0.07) *** 
Life satisfaction -0.06 (0.15) 
 
-0.13 (0.12) 
 
0.24 (0.09) ** -0.14 (0.08)  
Country level             
GDP growth 0.01 (0.03)  -0.10 (0.06)  -0.03 (0.06)  -0.03 (0.05) 
 Unemployment -0.04 (0.03)  0.06 (0.05)  0.06 (0.05)  0.11 (0.04) * 
Corruption -0.11 (0.05) * 0.02 (0.09)  0.31 (0.08) *** 0.38 (0.08) *** 
Random effects 
            var(cons) 0.10 (0.03) 
 
0.367 (0.11) 
 
0.33 (0.10) 
 
0.29 (0.08) 
 Countries 25 25 25 25 
N 43130 41083 41072 41013 
ICC 0.028 0.100 0.090 0.080 
2log-likelihood -39792.9*** -18199.7*** 4874.02*** 14416.2*** 
Note: Entries are coefficients (B) from multilevel logistic regressions with standard errors (SE) in parentheses. Data 
weighted with design weight. Significance (P):  * p<0.05, ‘’ p<0.01, ‘’’p<0.001. 
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The following analyses turn to multivariate analysis in the form of multilevel logistics 
regressions shown in table 5, where H1 and H2 are examined in four models, one for 
each type of participation. 
For the categorical variable classifying citizens into groups, the satisfied citizens are 
the reference category, meaning the results show how the three kinds of dissatisfac-
tion differ from the satisfied citizens in their propensity for taking part in the political 
activities. 
For involvement in political parties, the negative estimates for each form of dissatis-
faction entail that belonging to either of these groups lowers the probability of being 
active within political parties compared to being satisfied. However, the effects are no-
ticeably stronger for the disempowered and the disenchanted, whereas the unsupport-
ive resemble the satisfied to a larger extent, as was already shown previously. 
For the non-institutionalized activities, the estimates are generally significant but the 
effects do not confirm the expectations since the estimates for the disempowered and 
the disenchanted are consistently negative. This entails that these forms of political 
dissatisfaction lead to a lower likelihood of involvement in all three of the non-
institutionalized activities when compared to the group of citizens who are satisfied. 
The estimates for the unsupportive to a larger extent live follow expectations since the 
positive estimates for demonstrations and boycotting suggest a higher extent of in-
volvement than the satisfied in these activities. 
Hence the results for H1 are only partly in line with expectations since the links be-
tween kinds of political dissatisfaction and participation are more complicated than ex-
pected. While all three kinds of dissatisfaction lead to a lower propensity for involve-
ment in political parties (Type 1 participation), thereby satisfying the first part of the 
hypothesis, being either disempowered or disenchanted also entail a lower extent of 
involvement in demonstrations, organizational involvement or boycotting (Types 2-4). 
The straightforward relationship suggested by previous literature does not hold for dif-
ferent kinds of political dissatisfaction since it only the unsupportive citizens who trans-
fer their engagement to non-institutionalized participation. 
For H2 concerning the effects of the economic indicators on participation, there is 
only one significant effect for the country level indicators GDP growth and unemploy-
ment, which is a positive estimate of 0.11 suggesting that a higher level of unemploy-
ment as expected increases the likelihood that people engage in political boycotts. The 
estimates for economic conditions are otherwise non-significant, meaning economic 
conditions at the country level are not important predictors for the propensity for po-
litical participation in three of the four types of participation. 
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This does not, however, entail that the economy is completely irrelevant for political 
participation since feelings about household income at the individual level has conse-
quences for political involvement in three of the political activities; the exception being 
boycotting. Nevertheless, even in this case the results generally contradict the asser-
tion that economic hardship promotes participation. It is only for demonstrations 
where a negative relationship exists, meaning economic hardship as expected makes 
demonstrating more likely. But for party activism and organizational involvement, it is 
those who feel better off economically who are more likely to become involved. There 
is therefore little to suggest that economic hardship is connected to increased political 
participation, meaning H2 can be rejected. If anything, the contrary seem to be the 
more likely outcome since those who feel they are doing well economically are more 
likely to participate. 
H3 concerns whether the economic conditions shape how kinds of political dissatis-
faction are translated into political activism. This is examined with a series of multilevel 
random effects models for each type of participation, where each model includes an 
interaction term between the kinds of dissatisfaction and an economic indicator at the 
country level. Based on the results, figures 1a-1i show the developments in predicted 
probabilities for involvement in each activity for kind of citizen as a function of changes 
in the economic conditions.2 
For party involvement, there is a significant interaction term for the disenchanted. 
Figure 1a shows that this entails that the disenchanted becomes less likely to be in-
volved in parties as the economy grows at a faster pace, whereas the satisfied becomes 
somewhat more likely to engage as the economy expands at a faster pace. In other 
words, and although the disenchanted are not particularly likely to be active, they be-
come more so during economic crisis. Hence, the disenchanted opt for political parties 
to channel their grievances to the decision makers when the economic situation looks 
bleak. For unemployment, there is no evidence of a similar effect since all kinds of citi-
zens become less likely to become involved as unemployment increases. 
There are no significant interaction effects for demonstrations, and accordingly the 
slopes for the four groups in figure 1d and 1e are fairly similar and indicate that 
demonstrating becomes more of an option for all four groups in times of economic cri-
sis whether measured with GDP growth or unemployment. As shown previously, re-
gardless of the economic situation, the unsupportive are most likely to be involved, the 
satisfied are the second largest group to attend demonstrations, while the disenchant-
ed and disempowered are the least likely to be active. 
 
2
 Separate models were run for each economic indicator meaning each model included one interaction. 
The estimates and standard errors for the constitutive variables in each model can be seen in appendix 2.  
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There are more significant interaction effects for organizational involvement, where 
a significant estimate exists for the interaction between GDP growth and the group of 
disempowered while there are two significant estimates for the unemployment rate; 
for disempowered and unsupportive (albeit only at a lenient 0.10 threshold). The impli-
cations are similar for both indicators of the economic conditions; as the economic 
conditions worsen (lower GDP growth or higher unemployment), all groups becomes 
somewhat more likely to engage in organizational activities. However, the impact is 
more acute for the disempowered when it comes to GDP growth in figure 1f since their 
willingness to be involved in organizations decrease more sharply as the economy 
grows at a faster pace. For unemployment in figure 1g, the impact is less acute for the 
disempowered since the change in predicted involvement is less drastic as the level of 
unemployment increases. The activity level of the unsupportive, on the other hand, in-
creases more drastically as the level of unemployment increases. It is interesting to 
note that at lower levels of unemployment, the satisfied citizens are most likely to be 
involved in organizations, but when the level of unemployment exceeds about 6 per 
cent, the unsupportive becomes the more active group of citizens. A similar, albeit less 
pronounced, can be seen for GDP growth in figure 1f. This suggests that when the 
economy is flourishing, citizens use this activity to channel system supportive messages 
to decision makers, but when economic conditions worsen, it becomes a channel for 
voicing discontent. 
For boycotting, there are also no significant estimates for the interaction terms, 
meaning there are no significant differences in the developments between the groups. 
For GDP growth (figure 1h), the groups of citizens become less likely to take part or ap-
pear relatively unaffected as the economy grows at a faster pace. The unsupportive are 
the most likely to be active, particularly at lower levels of economic growth. The devel-
opments are similar for unemployment in figure 1i, where all groups are more likely to 
become active as the level of unemployment increases, and it is again the unsupportive 
citizens who are most active while the disempowered are the least active group. 
To conclude, H3 is approved with some reservations since low economic perfor-
mance strengthens the effect of political dissatisfactions on political participation, alt-
hough the impact is not coherent for all activities. 
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Figure 1 – Predicted probabilities for participation 
ANNUAL GDP GROWTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
Figure 1a PARTY INVOLVEMENT Figure 1b 
  
Significant interactions (p): Disenchanted (0.05) Significant interactions (p): NONE 
Figure 1d  DEMONSTRATIONS Figure 1e 
  
Significant interactions (p): NONE Significant interactions (p): NONE 
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Figure 1 – Predicted probabilities for participation (continued) 
ANNUAL GDP GROWTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
Figure 1f ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT Figure 1g 
  
Significant interactions (p): Disempowered (0.05) Significant interactions (p): Disempowered(0.10), Unsupportive 
(0.10) 
Figure 1h BOYCOTTING Figure 1i 
  
Significant interactions (p): NONE Significant interactions (p): NONE 
Note: Figures show developments in predicted probabilities for involvement as economic conditions change. 
           Satisfied    +          Disempowered    x               Unsupportive                        Disenchanted 
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5. Discussion of the results 
 
The results have important implications for how citizens conveyed different kinds of 
political dissatisfaction to decision makers during the on-set of the economic crisis. 
First of all, the results show that not all kinds of dissatisfaction were conveyed to deci-
sion makers in an equal manner. Previous studies have often, explicitly or implicitly, 
posited a relatively straightforward relationship whereby political dissatisfaction leads 
to lower involvement in institutionalized activities and higher involvement in non-
institutionalized activities (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Inglehart 1997; Marien and Chris-
tensen 2013). While this holds true for the unsupportive citizens, who resemble the 
critical or assertive citizens identified by previous research ((Inglehart 1997; Norris 
1999, Rosanvallon 2008), other types of dissatisfaction were less likely to be conveyed 
to decision makers since both the disempowered and the disenchanted were less ac-
tive than the satisfied citizens in all types of participation examined here. 
Both of these forms of dissatisfaction involve low levels of subjective political em-
powerment, and this finding thereby supports the importance of subjective political 
empowerment for mobilizing dissatisfied citizens (cf. Gamson 1968). However, identify-
ing the kinds of citizens who perform certain activities reveals that political participa-
tion is about more than conveying grievances, even during economic crisis. The satis-
fied citizens were generally among the most active groups of citizens in all activities, 
showing that even ostensibly elite-challenging activities such as demonstrations are 
not necessarily a challenge to the political system as such (cf. Christensen, 2014). That 
political activists nowadays use new types of participation is therefore less due to citi-
zens becoming increasingly dissatisfied and more about having different preferences 
for when and how to convey their demands in creative new ways (cf. Micheletti and 
McFarland 2011). Given that these activities are less capable of sustaining representa-
tive democracy (cf. Mair. 2006; White and Ypi 2010), it is all the more important to en-
sure that decision makers give all forms of participation attention, even when coming 
through unorthodox channels. Since the traditional institutionalized activities are una-
ble to attract citizens and thereby ensure the link between citizens and representa-
tives, it is necessary to ensure that the representative system remains open for new 
ways that citizens communicate their demands. 
Furthermore, the greatest challenge to representative democracy during times of 
crisis does not come from citizens using novel activities for expressing their demands. 
Disempowerment and disenchantment both lead to apathy, suggesting that these par-
ticular grievances go unheard. This gives decision makers little chance to accommodate 
the demands even when possible, which could in the long run undermine democratic 
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legitimacy. To solve this problem, it is imperative to convince citizens that they can and 
should affect political decisions since high levels of subjective empowerment makes it 
more likely that citizens will take action when they feel the need arises. Where this to 
be a successful endeavor, it would mean turning more harmful forms of political dissat-
isfaction into a benign unsupportiveness that can even benefit the functioning of de-
mocracy. 
The direct impact of country level economic factors was less salient for involvement 
in all activities than often thought (della Porta and Mattoni 2014). There was some evi-
dence to suggest that people who are unsatisfied with their household income become 
more likely to demonstrate, which shows that this is the most important channel for 
venting grievances caused by economic hardship. However, both organizational in-
volvement and boycotting (albeit the estimate was insignificant) are more likely to be 
performed by citizens who are satisfied with their household income. Hence the 
changes in patterns of political participation, and in particular the popularity of new 
forms of non-institutionalized activities, are not primarily due to economic factors. This 
supports the ideas of Hutter (2014), who suggests that protest is increasingly a sign of 
cultural rather than economic issues. Nevertheless, the results also suggested that dif-
ferences in economic performance affect the links between kinds of dissatisfaction and 
participation. In particular, disenchanted citizens are slightly more likely to be involved 
in political parties as the economic conditions deteriorate. A possible interpretation is 
that these citizens are the ones who turn to populist radical right parties (Mudde 2007) 
when they experience economic hardship. While outside of the scope of this study, this 
suggests that it is helpful to examine the links between different kinds of political dis-
satisfaction and support for such populist parties to understand how these parties 
channel dissatisfaction into the political system. 
These findings hereby provide new insights into the links between political dissatis-
faction and participation during crises, but they are not without shortcomings. The da-
ta come from a particular period during the very early stages of the economic crisis and 
it cannot be ascertained that similar results would be obtained when the state of the 
economy deteriorates even further.  Furthermore, although the differences in econom-
ic performance were still rather large at the time, this also entails that it is not possible 
to establish whether the linkages only exist when the economy is in crisis or are valid 
even when the economy blossoms. Nonetheless, the results certainly indicate the im-
portance of decision makers remaining attentive to all types of participation to ensure 
that citizens’ grievances are channeled into political decision making, even during the 
very early phases of an economic crisis. 
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Appendix 1: Coding of variables 
 
Variable Survey question and coding of variables 
Political participation: There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from go-
ing wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? 
Party involve-
ment 
Worked in a political party or action group, dichotomous variable 0/1 (1=has done) 
Demonstrations Taken part in a lawful public demonstration, dichotomous variable 0/1 (1=has done) 
Organizational 
involvement 
Worked in another organisation or association, dichotomous variable 0/1 (1=has done) 
Boycotting Boycotted certain products, dichotomous variable 0/1 (1=has done) 
Political attitudes 
Satisfaction 
with democracy 
How satisfied are you with the way democracy works? Scored 0-10, recoded 0-1 (1 highest satisfac-
tion). 
Political trust  Composite index with questions indicating level of trust in: 1) [country]’s parliament; 2) politicians; 3) 
political parties. Scored scale 0—10, index coded 0-1 (1 highest trust; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) 
Political interest How interested in politics?’. Recoded to vary between 0-1 (1 = Very interested). 
Internal political 
efficacy 
2 questions: How often politics so complicated that you can't understand what is going on? & How 
difficult to make mind up about political issues? Index coded 0-1 (1 highest efficacy). 
Economic indicators 
GDP growth Percentage growth rate of GDP in 2007. Source World Bank  
Unemployment Rate of unemployment in 2007; Source OECD  
Feelings house-
hold income 
Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income 
nowadays?, scored 1-4, coded 0-1 (1 =most satisfied) 
Control variables 
Corruption Level of corruption in 2007; Source Transparency International.  
Age Age in years divided by 100. 
Gender Gender of respondent; Dichotomous 0/1 (1=male). 
Education ‘Highest level of education achieved’? Coded to vary between 0-1 (1 highest educational attainment). 
Party identifica-
tion 
Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? Dichotomous variable 
0/1 (1 = yes). 
Voted Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] nation-
al election in [month/year]? Dichotomous variable 0/1 (1 = yes). 
Social trust Composite index with 3 questions: 1)Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful; 2) Most 
people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance; 3) People try to be helpful. Scored 
scale 0-10; Index coded 0-1 (1 highest social trust; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80) 
Social life How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleague? Scored 1-7, coded to vary between 0-1 (1 
most social) 
Life satisfaction How satisfied with life as a whole? Coded to vary between 0-1 (1 most satisfied) 
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Appendix 2: Models for interaction effects 
 
 
Party involvement Demonstration Organizational involvement Boycotting 
 
#GDP #Unemployment #GDP #Unemployment #GDP #Unemployment #GDP #Unemployment 
 B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P 
Fixed effects 
                        
Constant -4.44 (0.20) *** 0.20 
-
(22.33) *** -3.51 (0.16) *** -3.49 (0.14) *** -2.76 (0.13) *** -2.77 (0.13) *** -2.36 (0.14) *** -2.37 (0.13) *** 
Disempow-
ered -1.43 (0.11) *** -1.43 (0.11) *** -0.54 (0.10) *** -0.55 (0.09) *** -0.75 (0.08) *** -0.72 (0.06) *** -0.63 (0.07) *** -0.62 (0.07) *** 
Unsupportive -0.23 (0.08) ** -0.22 (0.07) ** 0.38 (0.07) *** 0.34 (0.06) *** 0.04 (0.04) NS 0.05 (0.04) NS 0.30 (0.06) *** 0.31 (0.06) *** 
Disenchanted -1.22 (0.11) *** -1.27 (0.11) *** -0.36 (0.14) ** -0.41 (0.11) *** -0.68 (0.06) *** -0.66 (0.06) *** -0.23 (0.07) ** -0.22 (0.06) *** 
GDP growth 0.02 (0.07) NS 
   
-0.14 (0.12) NS 
   
-0.02 (0.04) NS 
   
-0.03 (0.05) NS 
   Unemploy-
ment 
   
-0.06 (0.03) NS 
   
0.04 (0.07) NS 
   
0.05 (0.03) NS 
   
0.08 (0.04) * 
GDP # Disem-
powered 0.02 (0.05) NS 
   
0.01 (0.04) NS 
   
-0.07 (0.03) * 
   
0.03 (0.03) NS 
   GDP # Unsup-
portive -0.01 (0.04) NS 
   
0.05 (0.04) NS 
   
-0.02 (0.02) NS 
   
-0.03 (0.03) NS 
   GDP # Disen-
chanted -0.11 (0.05) * 
   
0.07 (0.10) NS 
   
-0.03 (0.03) NS 
   
0.02 (0.04) NS 
   Unemploym. # 
Disempow-
ered 
   
-0.04 (0.03) NS 
   
-0.02 (0.03) NS 
   
-0.03 (0.02) NS 
   
0.03 (0.03) NS 
Unemploym. # 
Unsupportive 
   
0.03 (0.02) NS 
   
0.03 (0.02) NS 
   
0.03 (0.01) NS 
   
0.03 (0.02) NS 
Unemploym. # 
Disenchanted 
   
0.06 (0.04) NS 
   
0.05 (0.06) NS 
   
-0.01 (0.02) NS 
   
0.03 (0.02) NS 
Random ef-
fects 
                        var(cons) 0.12 (0.04) 
 
0.11 (0.03) 
 
0.11 (0.03) 
 
0.41 (0.11) 
 
0.33 (0.10) 
 
0.33 (0.10) 
 
0.27 (0.08) 
 
0.27 (0.08) 
 var(disempow) 0.07 (0.07) 
 
0.04 (0.06) 
 
0.04 (0.06) 
 
0.07 (0.03) 
 
0.07 (0.04) 
 
0.07 (0.03) 
 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.03 (0.02) 
 var(unsupp) 0.02 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
 
0.03 (0.01) 
 
0.04 (0.02) 
 var(disench) 0.06 (0.10) 
 
0.07 (0.10) 
 
0.07 (0.10) 
 
0.18 (0.08) 
 
0.03 (0.03) 
 
0.03 (0.02) 
 
0.02 (0.01) 
 
0.02 (0.02) 
 ICC 0.034 0.033 0.105 0.110 0.092 0.091 0.075 0.075 
Note: Entries are coefficients (B) from multilevel logistic regressions with standard errors (SE) in parentheses. The models also include the control variables 
listed in table 5. Data weighted with design weight. Significance (P):  * p<0.05, ‘’ p<0.01, ‘’’p<0.001. 
 
 
